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China's investment rate is one of the highest in the world, which naturally leads one to suspect that
the return to capital in China must be quite low.  Using the data from China's national accounts, we
estimate the rate of return to capital in China.  We find that the aggregate rate of return to capital averaged
25% during 1978-1993, fell during 1993-1998, and has become flat at roughly 20% since 1998.  This
evidence suggests that the aggregate return to capital in China does not appear to be significantly lower
than the return to capital in the rest of the world.  We also find that the standard deviation of the rate
of return to capital across Chinese provinces has fallen since 1978.
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  China has one of the highest investment rates in the world, over 40 percent of 
its GDP in recent years. A natural question to ask is: Does China invest too much? On 
the one hand, China is still a low-income economy, with a capital-labor ratio that is 
low compared with those of advanced economies, and thus the potential returns to 
investment could be high. On the other hand, as Robert Lucas pointed out,
1 other 
constraints, such as low levels of human capital, backward technology, and low 
quality of institutions, may limit the realization of the potential high returns to capital 
in China as in other developing countries. The fact that capital often flows from poor 
to rich countries reminds us that the return to capital is not always higher in poor 
countries.  
What does it mean to say that China invests too much? A natural metric to use 
in answering this question is the return to capital. For example, China’s economic 
growth rate might have been so high that the return to capital has fallen little if at all, 
despite high investment rates. Put differently, the investment rate in China might be 
high precisely because the return to capital in China is high. The questions to be 
asked, then, are: Has the return to capital in China fallen significantly over time? Is it 
now low relative to returns in other countries?  
Another issue concerns the allocation of investment within China--whether 
China has invested too much in certain sectors or certain regions and too little in other 
sectors and regions? Does the return to capital differ significantly across sectors and 
provinces in China? Has this dispersion of returns changed over time? 
This paper measures the return to capital in China, calculated using data on the 
share of capital in total income, the capital-output ratio (where both capital and output 
are measured at market prices), the depreciation rate, and the growth rate of output 
prices relative to capital prices. Although the approach is conceptually 
                                                 
1 Lucas (1990).   
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straightforward, the major challenge is the data, which we discuss below before 
presenting our estimates. 
Although we are not aware of any other papers that estimate the aggregate return 
to capital in China, many papers have reported estimates of the capital stock in the 
course of estimating productivity growth in China.
2 Our estimates of the capital stock 
in China differ from these earlier estimates in two principal ways. First, we make use 
of the updated data reported by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) after the 
2004 census. Second, we calculate the capital stock in market prices rather than in 
constant prices. We do this because our goal is to calculate the return to capital, which 
is a function of the capital-output ratio measured at market prices. 
We begin by discussing the methodology we use to estimate the return to 
capital. We next discuss the data and address several potential measurement 
problems. We then present our estimates of the aggregate return to capital in China, 
first for a base case using simple aggregate measures and then for a number of 
alternatives. These include alternative sectoral concepts that remove residential 
housing, agriculture, and mining, and alternative capital concepts that include 
inventories and consider various depreciation rates for fixed capital. We also measure 
after-tax returns for our base case, and we compare our base case estimate of the 
return to capital for China with estimates for other economies. Finally, we consider 
the efficiency of capital allocation in China by measuring the dispersion of the return 
to capital across sectors and regions and how it has changed over time.   
Our base case estimate shows that the aggregate rate of return to capital in China 
fell from roughly 25 percent between 1979 and 1992 to about 20 percent between 
1993 and 1998 and has remained in the vicinity of 20 percent since 1998.  These rates 
of return are above rates of return for most advanced economies calculated on similar 
basis. They are also high relative to a large sample of economies at all stages of 
development. Estimates with the alternative treatment of residential housing and 
business inventories show returns rising in recent years. All in all, our findings on the 
                                                 
2 For example, Perkins (1988), Chow and Li (2002), Huang, Ren, and Liu (2002), and Young (2003).  
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returns to capital provide no evidence to believe that China invests too much at the 
aggregate level--all sectors, regions, and types of ownership included. And what 
evidence we have on the dispersion of returns suggests that investment in China is 




There are several methods one can use to measure the return to capital. One 
method is to use estimates of the return to capital in financial markets to back out the 
aggregate return to capital. This would be a natural method to use in a country with 
well-developed financial markets, but it is clearly inappropriate in the Chinese 
context. A second method is to estimate the return to capital by regressing output on a 
measure of the capital stock. However, this method would lead to biased estimates of 
the return to capital, because the capital stock is surely affected by omitted variables 
that also affect aggregate output. 
The method we will use to measure the return to capital is quite simple in that it 
is based on only one assumption and one accounting identity. Consider a decision by 
a firm at the margin to purchase a unit of capital for use in production. If we assume 
that the firm takes the output price as given (we will relax this assumption later), the 
nominal return from this transaction is 
 
(1) 












Here i is the nominal rate of return, PY is the price of the output good, PKj is the price 
of capital of type j, δj is the depreciation rate of type  j  capital, MPKj is the marginal 
physical product of type j capital, and  ˆ
j K P is the percentage rate of change of the price 
of capital of type j. (This is simply a rewriting of the Hall-Jorgenson rental price 
equation.) Two things are important to notice about this equation. First, if asset  
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markets for capital goods are working efficiently, the return from investing in capital 
should be the same for every type of capital and for every investor. Clearly, capital 
markets may not work efficiently. Second, what matters for determining the return to 
capital is not the marginal physical product of capital, but rather the ratio of the 
marginal revenue product of capital to the price of capital.  
We cannot estimate the nominal return to capital directly from the above 
equation, because we do not observe the marginal product of capital. However, we 
can infer it from data on capital’s share of total output, which we may proxy as 1 
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Substituting equation 1 into this accounting identity, we get 
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denotes the average depreciation rate. The real rate of return to capital r(t) can then be 
calculated from equation 3 as 
 
(4)  ( )
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We will use this formula to measure the real rate of return to capital in China (which 
we refer to as the “return to capital” for short).  
The key thing to notice about equation 4 is that we measure the capital-output 
ratio at market prices, which includes any expected change in the price of capital as 
part of its return. Francesco Caselli and James Feyrer also make this point in the 
context of measuring differences in the return to capital across countries.
3 When the 
price of capital is equal to the price of output and the growth rates of these two prices 
are the same, equation 4 boils down to the familiar expression that the real rate of 
return to capital is the ratio of the capital share in income to the real capital-output 
ratio minus the depreciation rate. 
Our expression for the return to capital assumes that firms take output prices as 
given. When the output price exceeds marginal cost, the capital share will include 
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3 Caselli and Feyrer (2006).  
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This shows that ignoring the presence of imperfect competition gives an upward bias 
to the marginal return to capital realized by firms. 
  What are plausible magnitudes of the resulting bias? If we assume that the 
price of capital grows at the same rate as the price of output; that the labor share is 50 
percent, the depreciation rate is 10 percent, and the nominal capital-output ratio is 
1.67;
4 and that firms take output prices as given, the real return to capital is 20 
percent. If we relax the price-taking assumption and assume a markup over marginal 
cost of 10 percent, the real return to capital falls to 14 percent instead. We will not 
take the markup into account when estimating the real return to capital in China. 
Since our goal is to compare the return to capital in China over time and with returns 
to capital in other countries, this comparison based on our estimates will be 
misleading only if the bias due to imperfect competition has changed over time in 




We need three pieces of data to back out the return to capital: a measure of 
aggregate output, a measure of the aggregate capital stock, and a measure of the share 
of payments to capital. We describe each in turn. 
 
Aggregate Output 
                                                 
4 As discussed later, these are the rough numbers in the case of China.  
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As with data for any country, one always has to consider the possibility that the 
GDP estimates provided by China’s NBS are inaccurate. Two important institutional 
details about the Chinese statistical system matter in this context. First, the backbone 
of the Chinese national accounts is the data provided by local governments to the 
NBS. Many observers argue that local governments have an incentive to overstate 
local GDP. Although this has been true in certain periods, the NBS is well aware of 
the problem and uses independently sourced data to adjust the data provided by local 
governments. As a result, reported aggregate GDP is typically lower than the sum of 
reported provincial GDPs. In addition, local governments do not always have an 
incentive to overstate GDP. In recent years, for example, the central government has 
been trying to cool down the economy, and this has given local governments an 
incentive to understate local GDP so as to evade the central government’s 
contractionary macroeconomic policies. 
Second, the NBS bases its adjustment to the locally provided data on nationwide 
economic censuses conducted every ten years.
5 After a census is conducted, the NBS 
retrospectively revises its previous estimates of aggregate GDP. Clearly, if the 
economy has been growing rapidly, the unrevised data will be less accurate as one 
gets further away from the latest census year, and thus the retrospective adjustments 
in the most recent years will be larger as well. Fortunately, the last such census took 
place fairly recently, in 2004, and the NBS has revised its estimates of nominal GDP 
from 1978 through 2004 on the basis of this census.
6  In these new data, GDP in 2004 
was revised upward by 16.8 percent, or several times the 4.4 percent upward revision 
for gross fixed capital formation from the same census. We will use the revised 
national accounts data provided by the NBS for our estimates, which will obviously 
account for some of the differences between the numbers we use for the investment 
rate in China and those used in previous studies. To maintain consistency, we also 
                                                 
5 Two censuses resulted in major revisions to the GDP data. The 1993 census was for the tertiary sector, and the 
2004 census was for all nonagricultural sectors.  
6 Revised GDP data are reported in the 2006 China Statistical Yearbook.  
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adjust the provincial estimates so that the sum of provincial GDPs equals the estimate 
of national GDP.
7 
Angus Maddison has criticized China’s GDP data from two angles, arguing that 
official GDP was underestimated for 1978 and that the growth rate of the official 
GDP deflator is too low.
8 However, any potential problem with the 1978 estimate 
would obviously only affect our estimate of the return to capital in that year, and not 
those for more recent years. The potential problem with the GDP deflator does not 
affect our estimate of the nominal return to capital, because we measure GDP in 
current instead of constant prices, but it would obviously affect our estimate of the 
real return to capital. We note, however, that the NBS retrospectively increased the 
growth rate of the GDP deflators after the 2004 census, and we use these revised 
deflators for our estimates.   
One might also be concerned about the profit data reported by firms, and in 
particular the possibility of overstatement. For example, if multinational firms face 
lower tax rates in China than in their home countries, they may deliberately, through 
their internal transfer pricing, overstate their profits and the value added of their 
Chinese operations so as to reduce their tax liability in the home country. There are 
several reasons why this needs not be a real problem, however. First of all, the profits 
reported to the government statistical agencies by firms in China are not to be used for 
tax purposes.
9 Second, some multinational firms can claim a tax credit in their home 
country for taxes paid to the Chinese government. Third, the problem just described 
affects only foreign firms; domestic firms do not necessarily face incentives to 
                                                 
7 Provincial GDP data are reported in NBS (2003) and in the 2004-06 editions of China Statistical Yearbook. 
Because we are mainly interested in the dispersion of returns among provinces, we did not revise provincial GDP 
and investment data after the 2004 census. Allocating the increase in GDP and investment among provinces 
proportionally would not change the results. 
8 Maddison (1998). To address the potential bias in the GDP deflator, Young (2003) uses alternative price indices 
to deflate nominal GDP.  
9 Article 33 of “Regulations on National Economic Census” states that “[T]he use of materials regarding units and 
individuals collected in economic census shall be strictly limited to the purpose of economic census and shall not 
be used by any unit as the basis for imposing penalties on respondents of economic census.”  
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overstate their profits. In fact, Hongbin Cai, Qiao Liu, and Geng Xiao find evidence 




The second thing we need to measure is the capital stock.  China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) releases a series called “investment in fixed assets.” This 
statistic, reported monthly, is the one most frequently used by Chinese government 
officials to measure aggregate investment. Figure 1 shows that investment in fixed 
assets increased from 20 percent of GDP in 1981 to just below 50 percent in 2005. 
This evidence has prompted many observers to conclude not only that China’s 
investment rate is too high, but also that this ongoing trend of a rising investment 
share in GDP cannot be sustained. 
However, there are two reasons why this widely used series may not provide an 
accurate measure of the change in China’s capital stock.
11 The first is that the NBS 
counts the value of purchased land and expenditure on used machinery and 
preexisting structures as part of investment in fixed assets. Clearly, neither of these 
should be regarded as an increase in China’s reproducible capital stock. The second is 
that the series is based on survey data for large investment projects only, which will 
obviously understate aggregate investment.
12 
Although less widely used, an alternative estimate of investment that addresses 
these problems, called “gross fixed capital formation,” is available from the NBS, but 
only once a year rather than monthly. The NBS calculates this measure by subtracting 
the value of land sales and expenditure on used machinery and buildings from 
investment in fixed assets, and then adds expenditure on small-scale investment 
projects. As figure 1 shows, the investment rate as measured by the share of gross 
fixed capital formation in GDP increased much less rapidly than did that measured by 
                                                 
10 Cai, Liu, and Xiao (2006). 
11 Xu (2000). 
12 Specifically, before 1997 the investment survey asked firms to report all investment expenditures over 50,000 
yuan. Beginning in 1997 the threshold was increased to investment expenditures over 500,000 yuan.    
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investment in fixed assets, rising from 30 percent in 1978 to 42 percent in 2005. Since 
gross fixed capital formation is a more accurate measure of the change in China’s 
reproducible capital stock, this is the series we will use to measure the capital stock in 
China. 
The main limitation of this series is that it is not disaggregated into different 
types of investment, whereas the series on investment in fixed assets is disaggregated 
into investment in structures and buildings and investment in machinery and 
equipment.
13 To get around this problem, we assume that the shares of the two types 
of capital in fixed capital formation are the same as those for total investment in fixed 
assets.
14  
We now turn to the investment price deflators. After 1990 the NBS reports 
separate price indices for investment in structures and buildings and for investment in 
machinery and equipment. For 1978-89 we assume that the price of structures is 
accurately measured by the deflator of value added in the construction industry.
15 
Similarly, we assume that the price of machinery and equipment during the same 
period is accurately measured by the output price deflator of the domestic machinery 
and equipment industry. Before 1978 we assume that the growth rate of the prices of 
the two types of investment goods is simply the growth rate of the aggregate price of 
fixed capital formation.
16 
With data on nominal investment and investment prices in hand, we estimate the 
quantity of the two types of capital using the standard perpetual inventory approach. 
We initialize the capital stock in 1952 as the ratio of investment in 1953 (the first year 
for which investment data are available) to the sum of the average growth rate of 
                                                 
13 This is why many Chinese researchers (for example, Huang, Ren, and Liu, 2002; Wang and Wu, 2003) use 
investment in fixed assets series to estimate the capital stock.  
14 Our data for 1952-77 are from Hsueh and Li (1999). Data for 1978-2004 were adjusted after the 2004 National 
Economic Census and are published in China Statistical Yearbook 2006 together with the 2005 data.  
15 From 1990 to 2004 (when both series are available), the correlation between the construction output deflator and 
the deflator for investment in structures is 0.95.   
16 The price indices for fixed capital formation before 1978 are from Hsueh and Li (1999).   
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investment in 1953-58 and the depreciation rate. We assume that the depreciation rate 
is 8 percent for structures and 24 percent for machinery.
17 
Our procedure for calculating the capital stock differs from those used by other 
authors. Dwight Perkins uses the capital accumulation series reported by the NBS 
under the Material Production System (the national accounts system used under 
central planning); this series is no longer available after 1993.
18 He assumes an annual 
depreciation rate of 5 percent and an initial capital-output ratio (in 1980) of 3. 
Gregory Chow and Kui-Wai Li measure investment by gross capital formation 
(including inventories) use accounting depreciation reported in the national accounts 
instead of economic depreciation, and use Chow’s proprietary data to estimate the 
initial capital stock (in 1953).
19 The procedure we use is conceptually similar to that 
used by Yongfeng Huang, Ruoen Ren, and Xiaosheng Liu and by Alwyn Young,
20 
although the details differ. Huang, Ren, and Liu use investment in fixed assets 
disaggregated into investment in structures and buildings and investment in 
machinery and equipment. They deflate nominal investment (of both types of capital) 
by the retail price index. Young computes the capital stock for the nonagricultural 
sector from the NBS series on gross fixed capital formation but does not distinguish 
the two types of capital. In turn, he imputes the price index for investment as the 
residual of the price of aggregate nonagricultural output after subtracting the price of 
consumption and export goods.  
 
Share of Capital 
The final piece of information we need is the share of capital in total income, 
which we calculate as the residual of labor income. The NBS provides annual data on 
                                                 
17 We arrive at these estimates of depreciation rates from estimates of the useful lives of structures and buildings 
(thirty-eight years) and machinery and equipment (twelve years) in Wang and Wu (2003).  
18 Perkins (1988). 
19 Chow and Li (2002); Chow (1993). 
20 Huang, Ren, and Liu (2002); Young (2003).  
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the labor share for each province and each sector but not for the aggregate economy.
21 
We therefore estimate the aggregate labor share as the average of the provincial labor 
shares weighted by the share of each province in GDP. As table 1 shows, the resulting 
estimate of the capital share typically fluctuates between 46 and 50 percent of GDP 
but experiences a sharp rise from 2003 through 2005.  
[table 1 about here] 
There are potentially two concerns about our use of the NBS estimate of 
aggregate labor income in this calculation. First, the reported labor shares may 
understate true labor income (and thus overstate true capital income) if there are 
unmeasured nonwage benefits. However, the NBS explicitly includes an estimate of 
nonwage benefits in the numbers for labor income. In the manufacturing sector, for 
example, nonwage benefits account for 20 percent and wage income for 30 percent of 
aggregate income in the sector.
22  
Second, the NBS estimates may again understate the labor share if, as in many 
developing countries, the reported figures for aggregate labor income exclude the 
imputed labor income of self-employed workers.
23 In fact, before 2005, the NBS 
counted all self-employment income as labor income. Therefore our estimates for 
those years actually overstate the true labor share and understate the true capital share. 
In 2005 the NBS for the first time explicitly excluded the imputed capital income of 
self-employed workers from the published estimates of labor income. Unfortunately, 
the NBS does not report the magnitude of this adjustment, and so we are unable to 
adjust our capital share estimates accordingly for the years before 2005. 
                                                 
21 See Hsueh and Li (1999) for 1978-95, NBS (2003) for 1996-2002, China Statistical Yearbook 2004 for 2003, 
and China Statistical Yearbook 2006 for 2005. The share of capital in total income for 2004 is missing from the 
official data and is therefore taken to be the average of those for 2003 and 2005.  
22 We get the 30 percent wage income share by aggregating wage payments and value added from firm-level data 
from the Chinese industrial survey in 2003. Since the NBS reports that the share of total labor compensation 
(including nonwage benefits) in the manufacturing sector is 50 percent, the NBS’s imputed nonwage income must 
be 20 percent of manufacturing value added.  
23 Gollin (2002).  
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Estimates of the Return to Capital  
 
Figure 2 plots our base case estimate of the aggregate rate of return to capital in 
China, derived from equation 4 and the data in table 1. Again, this estimate properly 
aggregates structures and equipment and measures the capital-output ratio in current 
prices. As the figure shows, the annual return to capital in China fell between 1993 
and 1998 from roughly 25 percent to 20 percent. Since 1998 the annual return to 
capital has remained in the vicinity of 20 percent, despite the 8-percentage-point 
increase in the investment rate (figure 1). Therefore, a central finding is that, despite 
China having one of the highest rates of investment in the world, the return to capital 
in China does not appear to be significantly lower than that in the rest of the world.
24 
Two remarks about the underlying data are in order. First, the gap between the 
growth rate of the investment goods deflator and the growth rate of the GDP deflator 
was extremely volatile during the 1992-95 period: the relative price of capital rose 10 
percent a year in 1992-93 and fell by 10 percent a year in 1994-95. In all other years 
the relative price of capital grew at a roughly constant annual rate of slightly under 3 
percent. To eliminate the volatility in the estimated return to capital caused by the 
volatility in the relative price of capital during 1992-95, we adjust the GDP deflator 
over this period by assuming that its growth rate was proportional to that of the 
investment goods deflator over the same period, while maintaining the accumulated 
growth of the GDP deflator over this period. 
Second, the data we use for 2004 and 2005 are preliminary, for three reasons. 
One is that the NBS did not provide an estimate of the labor share in 2004. We 
therefore assumed that the labor share in 2004 is the average of the labor share in 
2003 and 2005. Another is that, as noted earlier, the labor share in 2005 excludes the 
imputed capital income of self-employed workers, but the NBS does not make a 
similar adjustment for earlier years. Finally, the 2005 data reported in the 2006 China 
Statistical Yearbook are preliminary and are likely to be revised by the NBS in 2007.  
                                                 
24 See, for example, Poterba (1999) for a comparison of rates of return to capital in a sample of OECD countries. 
26 Data on investment in residential housing are from China Statistical Yearbook, various years. The price index 
and the depreciation rate for buildings and structures are used to construct the stock of residential housing. Total  
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The base case provides estimates of the rate of return that are most comparable 
with commonly cited aggregate measures for other countries. Alternative measures 
that require additional, disaggregated data may be more useful for some purposes, but 
these data may be less reliable. Nonetheless, it is useful to look at some alternative 
estimates using the data that are available. These estimates address both conceptual 
and measurement issues that affect the base case. They include alternative measures 
of the capital stock relevant for business investment and alternative measures of the 
income associated with such investment. 
We first measure the return to capital excluding residential housing. Investment 
in residential housing has increased very rapidly in China, but it is possible that the 
flow of services generated by the housing stock is undervalued in the Chinese national 
accounts. Specifically, the NBS imputes the rental value of the housing stock as 3 
percent of the original value of the housing stock. Figure 3 presents our estimate of 
the return to the nonhousing capital stock, which we calculate by excluding the 
residential housing stock from the aggregate capital stock and subtracting the imputed 
rent on urban residential housing from our estimate of aggregate output and capital 
income.
26 As the figure shows, the annual return to nonhousing capital is roughly 5 
percentage points higher than the annual return to the aggregate capital stock. 
In the base case we measure capital income as the difference between labor 
income and total income. However, nonlabor income includes rents to agricultural 
land and mineral resources as well as the return to reproducible capital. Ideally, one 
would like to exclude these rents from our measure of capital income. In the absence 
of data that would allow us to do this, we estimate the return to capital in the 
nonagricultural and nonmining (and petroleum) sectors.
27 That is, we exclude the 
                                                                                                                                            
residential rent is computed by multiplying urban population by urban housing rent (or expense) per capita, 
obtained from China Statistical Yearbook, various years.  
27 Data on the value added of mining industries before 1995 are from China Industrial Economy Statistical 
Yearbook and those after 1995 are from China Statistical Yearbook. Data on investment in the mining industries 
before 2000 are from NBS (2001), and those after 2000 are from China Statistical Yearbook 2006. The investment 
data include only construction and installation. The underestimate of the investment in the mining sector will result 
in a downward bias of the estimated return to capital when the mining sector is excluded.   
  15
(reproducible) capital stock in the agriculture and mining sectors from the capital 
stock: we exclude output in these two sectors from our estimate of aggregate output; 
and we exclude capital income in these two sectors from our measure of aggregate 
capital income. 
As can be seen in figure 4, the return to capital in the nonagricultural sectors 
slightly exceeds the aggregate return to capital in the early 1980s, but the two are 
virtually the same after 1988. Similarly, the return to capital in the nonmining sectors 
(figure 5) is higher than the aggregate return to capital in the 1980s. During this 
period the government set prices of mineral products artificially low. However, the 
gap narrows in the 1990s, after the prices of mineral products and petroleum went up 
sharply. For most of the period, the returns in these two alternative measures differ 
only little from the returns in the base case.  
Our base case estimate assumes constant depreciation rates over time. However, 
given that depreciation reflects not only physical depreciation but also technological 
obsolescence, it seems plausible that obsolescence was lower before 1978, when there 
was presumably less technical progress. To consider the implications of this 
possibility, we estimate the return to capital under the assumption that the 
depreciation rate was 4 percentage points lower between 1952 and 1978 than after 
1978, which changes our estimate of the capital stock. As figure 6 reveals, this 
alternative assumption leads to a lower return to capital in the earlier period and a 
similar return to capital in the later period compared with the base case.  
In the base case, capital income includes taxes, both on output (such as the value 
added tax) and on enterprise income. Although society as a whole receives the return 
to capital gross of taxes, business investment is driven by the after-tax return. Figure 7 
presents an estimate of the return to capital when we exclude these taxes from capital 
income.
28 As the figure shows, the after-tax return to capital is about 10 percentage 
points lower than the before-tax return. 
                                                 
28 Data for net taxes on production are from Hsueh and Li (1999), NBS (2003), and China Statistical Yearbook 
2004 and 2006. Data on enterprise income tax are from China Statistical Yearbook 2006.   
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So far we have treated the return to capital as a return to investment in fixed 
capital. But business also invests in inventory. Assigning all the return to fixed 
investment in effect treats the return to inventory investment as zero. Yet, in many 
cases, the inventory stock may be an important part of an enterprise’s total investment. 
Our next alternative therefore adds inventories to the stock of fixed capital in order to 
calculate the return on total reproducible capital. As can be seen in figure 8, the 
inclusion of inventories results in a more than 10-percentage-point drop in the return 
to capital in the early 1980s and a 5-percentage-point drop in recent years. (We use 
the GDP deflator as the price index for inventory and assume zero depreciation.) The 
reason is that the increase in inventories was a much larger share of gross capital 
formation in earlier years than it is now (22.1 percent in 1978, compared with 2.6 
percent in 2005). Perhaps more important than this effect on the estimated level of the 
return to capital is the observation that including inventories results in a modest rise in 
the return to capital from 1978 to 2004 instead of the small decline seen in the base 
case estimate. 
Three of the alternatives we have considered—those for residential housing, 
inventories and taxes--make a substantial change to either the level or the time path of 
the estimated rate of return in the base case. Figure 9 presents estimates of the return 
to capital between 1985 and 2005 when these alternatives are combined and compares 
them with the base case. The middle curve represents the estimate when taxes are not 
removed from capital income. The resulting annual return is between 15 and 20 
percent and is rising to new highs in recent years. The lower curve represents the 
estimate when taxes are excluded from capital income. Here the annual return 
fluctuates around 10 percent, and it, too, has recently risen to new highs. 
We can compare our results with estimates by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) that use data from the industrial firm database 
provided by the NBS.
29 The NBS database covers the period from 1998 to 2003 and 
includes all industrial enterprises with annual sales of 5 million yuan or higher. 
                                                 
29 Dougherty and Herd (2005).  
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Average rates of return on physical capital estimated for these industrial enterprises 
are 6.1 percent for 1998 and 12.2 percent for 2003, figures that roughly correspond to 
our estimates that include inventories in the capital stock and exclude urban 
residential housing and taxes (8.8 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively). However, 
one has to be cautious about estimates of the return to capital measured from firm-
level data.  First, the capital stock from firm-level data is almost always measured as 
the book value, rather than the market value.  Second, such data is rarely 
comprehensive, which obviously makes it difficult to make inferences about the 
return to capital in the aggregate economy from such estimates.  Third, because firm-
level data can only contain the information of existing firms, it does not capture the 
return to capital of firms that have gone out of business. With aggregate data, 
however, the aggregate capital stock includes the capital stock of firms that have 
disappeared from the marketplace.  Therefore, our estimates based on aggregate data 
would capture the effect of business failures on the aggregate return to capital, but 
estimates based on firm level data would not. 
Finally, it is worth comparing the return to capital in China with that in other 
economies. Ideally, one would want to measure the capital share and the capital-
output ratio in all economies worldwide with the same degree of detail with which we 
measure these variables in China, but this would be prohibitively time consuming. As 
a shortcut, we instead compute the capital-output ratio for the sample of economies in 
the Penn World Tables. For the capital share of income, we take the residual of the 
labor income share reported in 2001 by Ben Bernanke and Refet Gurkaynak; we also 
assume a depreciation rate of 6 percent a year.
30 This produces somewhat different 
estimates for China than those from our detailed analysis above, but the common data 
set provides a more direct comparison with the other economies. Figure 10 plots the 
return to capital against output per worker for this set of economies, again using 
equation 4 and measuring the capital-output ratio at market prices. As the figure 
                                                 
30 Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001).  
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shows, the return to capital is significantly higher in China than in most of the other 
economies.  
 
Returns to Capital across Sectors and Regions 
 
We now examine the heterogeneity in returns to capital in China, considering 
first the allocation of capital across sectors. Figure 11 plots the return to capital in 
China’s primary (agriculture), secondary (construction, mining, and manufacturing), 
and tertiary (services) sectors. At the beginning of China’s reforms, the return to 
capital was high in the secondary sector, low in the tertiary sector, and still lower in 
the primary sector. The returns to capital in the three sectors converged through 1989, 
with a large increase in the primary and tertiary sectors and a decline in the secondary 
sector. However, returns to capital have again diverged since 1991, with an increased 
return in the secondary sector, a slight decline in the primary sector, and a significant 
decline in the tertiary sector. These estimates use the adjusted GDP data, where the 
revisions largely affected services output. One possible interpretation of the data is 
that, in the 1990s, many investments made in the tertiary sector (schools and 
infrastructure, for example) increased returns in the secondary sector rather than in the 
tertiary sector itself. It is also likely that much of the investment in the tertiary sector 
contributed to productivity and output with a substantial lag.  
Figure 12 plots the return to capital, again computed from equation 4, for each 
of China’s provinces in each year from 1978 to 2005. Provinces are assigned to one of 
three regions, eastern, central, and western, each represented in the figure by a 
common symbol. Two observations can be made immediately from the figure. First, 
the return to capital is generally highest in the eastern region, followed by the central 
region, and lowest in the western region. Second, the dispersion of returns to capital 
across provinces has decreased over time. Whereas in the early years of reform (1978-
1982), one province, Shanghai, stood out with a much higher return than all other 
provinces, the difference between Shanghai and the other provinces has been much  
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less prominent in later years. Figure 13 shows that the standard deviation of the return 
to capital across all provinces has a generally declining trend. 
Table 2 presents transition matrices in the return to capital across provinces in 
four subperiods. China’s twenty-eight provinces are grouped into quartiles based on 
the return to capital in the province; we then compute for each province the 
probability that, during a given period, it moves from its initial quartile to one of the 
other three. The results show little change in the rankings between the 1978-84 
subperiod and the 1985-91 subperiods. However, the mobility among the different 
groups markedly increased thereafter. For example, roughly 60 percent of provinces 
moved to a different quartile between the 1985-91 and the 1992-98 subperiod. Finally, 
it is worth noting that this mobility is observed mostly among the provinces in the top 






Our estimates from China’s national accounts data suggest that the return to 
capital in China has remained high despite China’s remarkably high investment rates. 
Our base case estimate is that the aggregate real rate of return to capital in China is 
currently about 20 percent a year, somewhat lower than the estimates for the early 
1990s, for example, but not low by comparison with other economies. Our alternative 
estimates, which adjust the base case for inventories, residential capital, and taxes, 
average somewhat lower returns but show those returns rising to new highs in recent 
years.   
Why have China’s high investment rates not brought low returns to capital? 
We see two possible reasons. First, output growth, driven by growth in total factor 
productivity and in the labor force, appears to have been quite rapid. Therefore the 
capital-output ratio does not appear to have risen by much, despite the high 
                                                 
31 Others have examined the relationship between investment flow and marginal product of capital across 
provinces (Gong and Xie, 2004; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005).   
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investment rate. Second, the capital share of aggregate income has increased steadily 
in China since 1998, precisely the period that witnessed a significant increase in the 
investment rate. One explanation for this might be that a gradual restructuring of 
China’s industrial sector has moved it toward more capital-intensive industries, 
requiring higher aggregate investment rates in the steady state. Our data do not allow 
us to examine the sources of the increase in the aggregate capital share since 1998, but 
this is clearly a fruitful avenue for future research.  
One question we leave open concerns the allocation of investment in China. 
We have provided some evidence on the efficiency of investment allocation across 
provinces and across major sectors. We find clear evidence of misallocation but also 
some evidence that it may have lessened over time. However, it could be that the bulk 
of the capital misallocation takes place within provinces and within the three broad 
sectors. Data at the firm and farm level would be needed to address this question. 
However, we note that estimates by Hsieh and Peter Klenow, using firm-level 
manufacturing data, indicate improvement in the allocation of capital across firms 
within sectors since 1995.
32  
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Table 1. Variables Used in Calculating the Return to Capital in China, 1978-2005 
 





































1978 50.33  364.52  1.39  12.06  0.94  1.92  23.15 
1979 48.62  406.26  1.37  11.93  2.14  3.58  22.04 
1980 48.85  454.56  1.36  11.77  4.98  3.79  25.40 
1981 47.32  489.16  1.44  11.38  1.79  2.29  20.92 
1982 46.43  532.34  1.45  11.00  2.35  -0.25  23.65 
1983 46.46  596.27  1.43  10.76  3.77  1.00  24.47 
1984 46.32  720.81  1.34  10.60  4.81  4.94  23.91 
1985 47.10  901.60  1.24  10.63  8.61  10.21  25.74 
1986 47.18  1,027.52  1.32  10.81  7.53  4.75  27.83 
1987 47.47  1,205.86  1.34  10.75  6.99  5.16  26.57 
1988 48.28  1,504.28  1.28  10.78  12.50  12.08  27.45 
1989 48.49  1,699.23  1.41  10.82  9.52  8.51  24.55 
1990 46.64  1,866.78  1.49  10.94  7.31  5.84  21.89 
1991 49.97  2,178.15  1.44  10.85  9.06  6.85  26.08 
1992 49.91  2,692.35  1.36  10.73  15.53  8.24  26.37 
1993 49.63  3,533.39  1.31  10.65  29.37  15.12  27.92 
1994 48.89  4,819.78  1.39  10.59  10.25  20.61  24.86 
1995 47.44  6,079.37  1.37  10.68  4.97  13.74  24.05 
1996 47.20  7,117.66  1.39  10.65  4.52  6.44  21.38 
1997 47.11  7,897.30  1.48  10.55  2.13  1.51  21.99 
1998 46.88  8,440.23  1.57  10.55  0.02  -0.86  20.18 
1999 47.58  8,967.71  1.64  10.53  -0.14  -1.26  19.56 
2000 48.52  9,921.46  1.63  10.53  1.61  2.06  18.71 
2001 48.54 10,965.52  1.65  10.50  0.71  2.05  17.50 
2002 49.08 12,033.27  1.67  10.49  0.38  0.58  18.61 
2003 50.38 13,582.28  1.66  10.49  3.10  2.61  20.43 
2004
c  54.49 15,987.83  1.63  10.48  6.87  6.91  22.82 
2005
c  58.60  18,308.48*  1.72  10.47  1.43  3.92  21.04 
 
Source: NBS and authors’ calculations. 
a. At current prices. 
b. Using GDP deflator adjusted as described in the text for 1992-95. Estimated returns to capital 
without making the adjustment are 33.30, 41.47, 14.26, and 15.16 percent for 1992, 1993, 1994, 
and 1995, respectively.  
c. preliminary  
 




Source: Authors’ calculations using NBS data. 
a. Table reports the probability that a province moves from the indicated group in the 
initial period to the indicated group in the final period. Group 1 consists of those Chinese 
provinces ranked 1 through 7 by return to capital in the corresponding period; group 2, 
those ranked 8 through 14; group 3, those ranked 15 through 21; and group 4, those 
ranked 22 through 28. 
 
Final quartile  Initial 
quartile  1 2  3  4 
   From 1978-84 to 1985-91   
1  (highest)  0.71 0.14    0.14 0.00   
2  0.29   0.71   0.00  0.00  
3  0.00   0.14   0.57   0.29  
4 (lowest)  0.00   0.00  0.29   0.71 
      
  From 1985-91 to 1992-98 
1  0.43 0.29    0.29 0.00   
2  0.43   0.29   0.14   0.14  
3  0.14   0.43   0.14   0.29  
4  0.00   0.00  0.43   0.57  
  
  From 1992-98 to 1999-2005 
1  0.43   0.29   0.14  0.14  
2  0.57   0.14   0.14   0.14  
3  0.00   0.43   0.43   0.14  
4  0.00   0.14  0.29   0.57  
  
  From 1978-84 to 1999-2005 
1  0.43   0.29   0.14  0.14  
2  0.57   0.14   0.14   0.14  
3  0.00   0.43   0.43   0.14  
4  0.00   0.14  0.29   0.57 Source: NBS.
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Investment in fixed assets
Gross fixed capital formationSource: NBS and authors' calculations.
a. Dashed extension to line indicates preliminary results.











1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004Source: NBS and authors' calculations.
a. Dashed lines indicate preliminary results.











1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Base case
Capital stock excluding urban 
residential housingSource: NBS and authors' calculations.
a. Dashed lines indicate preliminary results.











1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Base case
Nonagricultural capital 
tkSource: NBS and authors' calculations.
a. Dashed lines indicate preliminary results or (for 1981-83 return to nonmining capital) data not available.











1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Base case
Nonmining capital stockSource: NBS and authors' calculations.
a. Dashed extensions to lines indicate preliminary results.











1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Depreciation rate 4 percentage points lower 
during 1952-78 than after
Base caseSources: NBS; Hsueh and Li (1999); authors' calculations.
a. Dashed lines indicate preliminary results.
b. Data on enterprise income tax is unavailable before 1985.
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Return net of taxes on output 
and enterprise income
b
Return net of taxes on output
Base caseSources: NBS and authors' calculations.
a. Dashed extensions to lines indicate preliminary results.
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Base case
Inventories included in capital stockSources: NBS and authors' calculations.
a. Dashed extensions to lines indicate preliminary results.
b. Data on enterprise income tax is unavailable before 1985.












1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Base case
Excluding urban residential housing, 
including inventories, before taxes
b
Excluding urban residental housing, 
including inventories, after taxesSources: Penn World Tables; Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001); authors' calculations.
a. Data are for 52 developed and developing countries worldwide.
Figure 10. Return to Capital and Output per Worker in a Sample of Economies, 1998
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a. Dashed lines indicate preliminary results.
b. Construction, mining, and manufacturing.
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cSources: NBS and authors' calculations.
a. Data for 2004 and 2005 are preliminary; each observation represents the estimated return in one of China's 28 provinces.

















∆ WesternSource: NBS and authors' calculations.
a. Dashed extension to line indicates preliminary results; data are for China's 28 provinces.
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